
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1	STATE OF MICHIGAN
2	13TH CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF GRAND TRAVERSE
3	FAMILY DIVISION
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5	WILLIAM D. NUMERICK,)
6	Plaintiff,)
7	-vs-
8	
9	Defendant.)
10	
11	At a session of said Court held on the
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13	
14	Family Division Judge.
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16	APPEARANCES:
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18	JOHN FERGUSON, JR.
19	On behalf of Plaintiff
20	
21	WILLIAM BOWRON
22	On behalf of Defendant
23	
24	
25	Janet McGee, CSR 3361



Traverse City, Michigan Friday, May 16, 2003 at 1:50 p.m. MR. FERGUSON: John Ferguson on behalf of William Numerick. I apologize, Mr. Ferguson, I THE COURT: 6 have not had an opportunity to digest your brief, and I want very much to do so. I am hopeful that it provides me with some law that I am not familiar 8 9 with. Is it going to? 10 MR. FERGUSON: In sum, yes, Your Honor. Much of the law relied on by the defense is 11 12 correct. It's distinguishable from the case at 13 bar. THE COURT: Before I have you continue 14 then, I just dealt with an issue not unrelated to 15 this earlier today. This is File 03-1891-DP, 16 William D. Numerick, Junior versus 17 now known as It's the 18 Court's understanding that Mrs. Smith is a married 19 20 woman. 21 MS. SMITH: Correct. 22 MR. BOWRON: That's correct, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: That there was born during the course of Mrs. Smith's marriage a child who was 24 born, weather conceived or not, but born during the 25

course of your marriage, is that correct? MS. SMITH: Correct. THE COURT: That you are married to Derrick Smith. And according to Mr. Bowron, your 5 attorney, the Paternity Act does not afford the 6 plaintiff, Mr. Numerick, standing to address the issue of paternity. Is that it in a nutshell? MR. BOWRON: That's it in a nutshell, 8 9 Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Numerick, you are requesting the motion for summary disposition --11 12 MR. BOWRON: That's correct, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: -- be denied. Mr. Ferguson, I am familiar with the Child Custody Act, the 14 15 Family Support Act and the Paternity Act. If you 16 could provide for the Court the reasons why you 17 believe Mr. Bowron's position is one that can be 18 distinguished in this case. 19 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. FERGUSON: 20 Essentially, all of the cases relied upon by Mr. 21 Bowron involve facts where the child is already 22 born before the punative father seeks to assert his 23 rights. In this case, Mr. Numerick sought a 24 judicial adjudication prior to the marriage in

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question.

Indeed, at a hearing he would have expected to prove that the Smiths were planning to get married after the child would have been born.

They changed their plans, whether to take advantage of the law or not is in my view immaterial.

Mr. Numerick is not seeking to split up their marriage. What he is trying to do is assert his rights as a father. The Paternity Act would give him that due process opportunity. By virtue of the fact that Ms. Smith, if you will, ran off and got married, his ability to get that prior adjudication has been essentially taken away from him. There are no circumstances in this factual scenario that would give him his due process rights under this Statute.

THE COURT: True.

MR. FERGUSON: There are two definitions of child born out of wedlock. The first one, which Mr. Bowron relies upon, is correct. I don't think it applies because it's an either or situation. We think the second definition applies here.

If there is a prior judicial adjudication to show that the child is born out of wedlock, punative father can have parental rights.

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that there

was something filed during --

MR. FERGUSON: No, Your Honor. Of course not. However, the gestational period for human beings is 40 weeks, and it seems unlikely that Mr. Numerick couldn't have done anything more quickly to assert his rights because as soon as he makes that move, theoretically Ms. Smith could have gotten married and barred his claim.

In order for a father to assert rights consistent with case law and the Statute and the constitution, we are submitting this is the way one goes about doing it. As soon as we know of the pregnancy, bring an action for paternity, that would preserve your opportunity to get that, quote, unquote, prior judicial adjudication. We don't think that it's just, simply put, to interrupt an adjudication procedure with this marriage.

Conversely, and I mentioned this in my brief, we think it would also be unjust for Mr.

Numerick to be able to enjoin in this case Ms.

Smith from getting married. That would be unfair, but the question before the Court is who is the biological father of this child and this is the way to go about doing it.

If the facts were consistent with the

cases that we have cited, the Girard line of cases where the child was already born into a nuclear family, then the policy argument makes sense it would be disruptive for a punative father to come forward, here I am with my checkbook. That's not what we are doing. When we filed this, she was single and believed that we were within our rights to make this claim.

THE COURT: Mr. Ferguson, what is your -- do you have a position with respect to Mr. Smith?

MR. FERGUSON: We have no position with respect to Mr. Smith. Again, Mr. Numerick doesn't seek to split their marriage up. He simply wants normal parenting time. I am quite confident that Mr. Numerick and Ms. Smith could come to some arrangement in terms of what that would mean. I don't believe we would be litigating those issues down the road.

THE COURT: You think the distinguishing characteristic between this case and the other lines of cases supportive of the Paternity Act, is that Mr. Numerick acted during the gestation period and prior to the birth of the child?

MR. FERGUSON: Correct. And prior to the marriage. That's also very key. It's the only way

that he has a meaningful opportunity to exercise his rights. Thank you, sir. THE COURT: Mr. Bowron, any comments? MR. BOWRON: Your Honor, the Statute 5 seems relatively clear with respect to Mr. 6 Numerick's standing to address the issue of paternity, one is whether the child -- it comes 8 down to an issue of whether the child is born out 9 of wedlock. 10 By definition with respect to marriage 11 the child was obviously born during the course of 12 Mrs. Smith's marriage, and as a result of that, the 13 first definition can't be met. Was there a prior 14 court determination? There has been no prior court 15 determination. The child is not born out of wedlock, and Mr. Numerick doesn't meet the standing 17 for purposes of proceeding on paternity. 18 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bowron. Mr. 19 Ferguson, any response? 20 MR. FERGUSON: No response, Your Honor. 21 I hope that Your Honor does take time to read my 22 motion or my brief in support. 23 THE COURT: I have read your motion and 24

brief in support. I honestly hope I am wrong. I

have to and am ruling that consistent with Mr.

Bowron's argument I do not believe your client has

standing under the Paternity Act. That's not to

say that policy considerations should not be looked

at, but I do not feel comfortable extending,

looking behind the legislative intent of the

Statute when the Statute does appear to be clear.

I have reviewed a number of the cases that you have cited in your brief. I am familiar with the Statutes in question. Despite the fact that I can appreciate your argument and distinction of bringing an action during the gestation period and prior to the marriage, indicating an action, it still doesn't take away from the literal interpretation of the Statute that would appear to indicate your client does not have standing. More than appear, it would specifically indicate your client does not have standing.

this in this jurisdiction and others. At the risk of asking questions of Mrs. Smith that I don't feel appropriate to ask her at this time, I am going to deny your motion for summary disposition. I'd ask Mr. Bowron to prepare an order.

I don't want to encourage you to appeal

1	this decision, but I do believe we need further
2	direction from the Court of Appeals that we haven't
3	received to date. Your argument and the logic
4	associated with your argument I think is sound, but
5	it's not one that at this time is consistent with
6	the law from the Court's perspective. I know it
7	doesn't seem logically fair certainly. I am not
8	suggesting logically that it is. That's my
9	ruling.
. 10	If I could see you both at the bench,
11	please.
12	MR. BOWRON: Your Honor, just for
13	clarification purposes, the Court is granting
14	defendant's motion on summary judgement, correct?
15	THE COURT: That's correct.
16	MR. FERGUSON: You said denied.
17	THE COURT: Yes, I am granting it. Thank
18	you.
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20	(A conference is had off the record at the bench.)
21	
22	MR. FERGUSON: While we were at the
23	bench, Mr. Bowron pointed out that our motion to
24	show cause is now rendered mute by the Court's
25	ruling.

1	THE COURT: Thank you.
2	MR. FERGUSON: Thank you.
3	MR. BOWRON: Thank you, Your Honor.
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5	(Hearing concluded at 2:05 p.m.)
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9	STATE OF MICHIGAN
10	COUNTY OF GRAND TRAVERSE
11	
12	I, Janet McGee, Official Court Reporter
13	for the Grand Traverse County Family Court, State
14	of Michigan, do hereby certify that the foregoing
15	transcript comprises a full, true, and correct
16	transcription to the best of my ability, of the
17	proceedings and testimony taken in the
18	above-captioned matter on the 16th day of May 2003.
19	$O = i \sim 10$
20	Janet Walle
21	Janet McGee, CSR 3361
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